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ABSTRACT 
 The purpose of this research is to examine how the six Texas Anti-Gang (TAG) 
task forces measure performance and other goal-setting mechanisms to counter the threat 
posed by gangs and determine ways measures and mechanisms can be improved. Using 
research from journals, U.S. government reports, and open sources, this thesis uses a 
policy analysis to examine TAG documents, policies, and processes and compare these 
with benefits and challenges from other gang task forces. The thesis identifies models and 
frameworks used by law enforcement and the business sector to measure performance in 
the TAGs. Thesis findings include a proposal to use a logic model and the objectives and 
key results framework for setting goals and measuring performance. The implementation 
of this recommendation should yield a TAG structure with quantifiable and reliable 
metrics of success that optimize the capabilities and resources of all participants. 
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Texas Anti-Gang Task Forces (TAGs) were initiated by the state of Texas in 2013 
to combine law enforcement efforts to counter criminal activities posed by violent gangs. 
The relationship between violent gangs and Mexican drug cartels is a significant problem 
in Texas, so and the mere existence of the six TAG centers has been a positive first step 
toward the problem. Since the six TAG centers are relatively new to Texas, there has not 
been an established process for measuring the success for the work being conducted. It is 
unclear what the strategy, goals, or objectives are for the TAG operational teams working 
against these gangs. 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer what is a good design for performance 
management and goal setting mechanism for the TAGs and how that might be improved 
in the state of Texas, specifically to improve collaboration and overall performance. 
I first conducted an examination of the TAG mission, structure, organization, 
processes, and outcomes. There is no system or requirement to measure performance, aside 
from criminal statistics, nor even a clear definition of success; these gaps have left the 
TAGs themselves with no reliable sense of whether or to what extent they have effected 
change in the gang or cartel landscapes. Research shows these weaknesses are not unusual 
in multi-agency task forces, however, it can be improved if leadership is willing. 
I then conducted an analysis of performance measurement models and frameworks 
inside both law enforcement and business sectors. I explored the objectives and key results 
(OKRs) framework as well as the logic model. 
This thesis recommends pivoting away from the current system of measuring 
performance by reporting crime statistics on a quarterly basis, and instead use a logic model 
to establish unified goals and objectives based on a strategy within each TAG center. The 
logic model forces the TAG teams to consider their outcomes and impact before actions 
are planned. Once a goal is established, the teams will decide on how to action those goals. 
This process should be transparent for individual agencies so that all TAG personnel 
understand their roles, plan strategies and tactics, and demonstrate alignment with the 
xvi 
overall TAG mission. This will enable stakeholders, sponsors, policy-makers, and citizens 
to assess the value and effectiveness of the TAGs. 
Aside from these recommendations, implementation will need to be carefully 
structured using the Criminal Justice Division (CJD) inside the Office of the Governor of 
Texas Greg Abbott Attorney General’s Office as the lead entity, as the funding and 
approval starts with them. There needs to be a leadership component that ensures the TAGs 
are adhering to policies and are accountable for actions. The implementation phase could 
take two years and within the first year, CJD and TAG administrators must be convinced 
that these models are essential and desirable. There is always resistance to change, 
therefore, it is important that the executive boards for each TAG be included early in the 
process. Since the executive boards are made up of representatives from each law 
enforcement agency, they will be the best group to identify problems in implementation. 
Their endorsement of the new approaches is critical for success. 
xvii 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
According to the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS), the association of 
gangs with Mexican drug cartels is one of the most substantial threats facing Texas.1 The 
Mexican cartels enlist gangs to support their smuggling and trafficking operations on both 
sides of the border. Texas DPS estimates there as many as 100,000 gang members currently 
living in Texas.2 Gang crimes and their activities affect the safety and security of 
communities across the state. In response to this threat, the Criminal Justice Division (CJD) 
inside the Office of the Governor of Texas Greg Abbott Attorney General’s Office initiated 
the Texas Anti-Gang Task Forces (TAGs) in 2013. Five years later, as of this writing, there 
are six TAG centers operating across the state to combat the gang problem (see Figure 1 
for locations). 
1 Angel Rabasa et al., Counternetwork: Countering the Expansion of Transnational Criminal 
Networks (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1481.html. 
2 Texas Department of Public Safety. Texas Gang Threat Assessment, Texas Joint Crime Information 




Figure 1.  TAG Centers in the State of Texas 
The mission, purpose, goals, and objectives for the TAGs are outlined in an internal 
document provided by CJD. TAG’s purpose is to “support strategic partnerships and 
targeted, regional, multidisciplinary approaches to successfully combat gang violence 
through the coordination of gang prevention, intervention, and suppression activities.”3 
The goals are simply to expand law enforcement resources and “sharing intelligence and 
information on prison gangs, street gangs, cross-border gang activity, and juvenile gang 
                                                 
3 Andrew Friedrichs, Associate Director–Criminal Justice Division, provided writer with an internal 
document, Texas Anti-Gang (TAG) Program dated May 15, 2017. 
3 
activity.”4 The mission, purpose, goals, and objectives have not been translated into clear 
and concise actions for the TAG centers, nor do the goals correlate to specific outcomes 
such as changes in crime rates, gang activities, or efficiencies of investigations. Even if 
those outcomes were identified, there are no metrics in place to quantify the extent to which 
goals or outcomes are achieved. 
Aside from quarterly crime statistical reports sent to CJD, it is unclear how TAG 
operations deter or combat the threat posed by gangs. There are no established metrics for 
measuring effectiveness, value, or impact. Assessing performance or measuring success 
has not been built into any type of process at the TAG centers. As discussed later in this 
thesis, research has demonstrated that crime statistics may not be the best tool to measure 
accomplishments or performance. 
The centers need an effective performance measurement system. There is no 
evidence that the TAG centers use any kind of mechanism to set goals and actions and then 
measure the impact that actions have on an articulable outcome. TAG centers operate 
independently of each other, and the executive boards are purposely leaderless so that that 
all participating agencies have equal input; however, this structure and lack of ownership 
means no is one monitoring goals and objectives to ensure that the mission is being 
enforced. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The thesis answers this question: What is a good design for a performance 
management and goal-setting mechanism for the TAGs in the state of Texas? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to examine the research on current successes 
and challenges within anti-gang task forces and determine what can be done to improve 
them. It explores research on performance metrics and inter-agency collaboration models 
and how these may be useful in a multi-agency environment to perpetuate collaboration 
4 Andrew Friedrichs, Associate Director–Criminal Justice Division, provided writer with an internal 
document, Texas Anti-Gang (TAG) Program dated May 15, 2017. 
4 
and set goals. The literature concentrates heavily on U.S. government sources and reports 
based on the nature and purpose of task forces and also encompasses other sources such as 
law enforcement and U.S. intelligence community practitioners, academic experts from 
within the field of performance metrics and collaboration, official U.S. federal agency 
websites, government press releases, professional journals, and global think tanks such as 
the RAND Corporation. 
1. Successes and Challenges of Multi-agency Gang Task Forces 
The majority of the research on this topic comes from U.S. government reports 
highlighting the successes and challenges of gang task forces. For example, the Global 
Information Sharing Initiative in 2008 recommended eight core principles useful in 
creating effective gang task forces. The report, Guidelines for Establishing and Operating 
Gang Intelligence Units and Task Forces, lists leadership, commitment, clear mission, 
communication, direction, evaluation, refinements, and sustainability as “critical to 
building and maintaining a successful task force.”5 It has some of the same elements as the 
TAG internal documents relating to structure and function and could be used as the 
foundation for the TAG; it is authoritative and provides some of the elements explored for 
this thesis. 
The benefits of using multi-agency gang task forces to combat crime is a common 
theme in the literature from U.S. government reports as well as in academia. A report 
sponsored by the National Defense Intelligence College in 2007 titled Can’t We All Get 
Along? suggests that multi-agency task forces are seen by law enforcement and intelligence 
community practitioners as a positive step toward addressing the global threat and 
recommends global policing for today’s crime problem.6 Global policing relates to TAGs 
in this context in that the crime threat posed by violent gangs spans borders, especially in 
                                                 
5 Gang Intelligence Strategy Committee, U.S. Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Gang 
Intelligence Units and Task Forces (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance, Department of Justice, 
October 2008), https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Content/Documents/Guidelines-for-Establishing-
Gang-Intelligence-Units.pdf. 
6 Can’t We All Just Get Along? Improving the Law Enforcement-Intelligence Community Relationship 
(Washington, DC: NDIC Press, 2007), http://niu.edu/ni_press/pdf/
Improving_the_Law_Enforcement_Intelligence_Community.pdf. 
5 
Texas, which borders Mexico. To address this threat, policing has to expand outside the 
U.S. border. This report incorporates essays written by law enforcement and U.S. 
intelligence community practitioners focusing on best practices and benefits of integrating 
agencies to work on a global crime problem. It is one of several government reports that 
emphasize the value of using multi-agency task forces against global crime problems, 
including violent gang crime in Texas. 
The literature indicates that the collection and dissemination of gang intelligence is 
also a success for many anti-gang task forces. Charles Katz and Vincent Webb, in a 2003 
study on police response to gangs, demonstrate that the most important benefit to multi-
agency anti-gang task forces is the production and dissemination of gang intelligence.7 
They examined the successes and challenges of four anti-gang task forces in the 
southwestern region of the United States. Their study is significant because it shows a 
pattern of sharing intelligence as a positive practice among separate and distinct anti-gang 
task forces, which may be useful as a practice for TAGs. 
Katz and Webb found few formal mechanisms within anti-gang task forces for 
controlling and managing gang units and their officers or for holding them accountable.8 
The four task forces independently evaluated in the study show a lack of policies, 
procedures, rules of behavior, mission statements, and purpose. The lack of structure is 
significant because structure correlates with measuring success and evaluating 
performance, both of which are areas of concern for TAGs. 
Measuring the success and impact of multi-agency gang task forces is a significant 
problem cited within the literature, primarily from U.S. government reports on anti-gang 
task forces. The recommendations for addressing these problems do not necessarily 
correlate with the problems identified in TAGs. A 2010 Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report found that measuring and tracking the performance and impact of gang task 
forces on crime is difficult because of a lack of standard performance metrics across federal 
7 Charles M. Katz and Vincent J. Webb, Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study (Phoenix: 
Arizona State University West, 2003), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/205003.pdf. 
8 Katz and Webb, Police Response to Gangs. 
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agencies as well as the lack of a clear definition for the word gang.9 The GAO report 
acknowledges that while “federal agencies have established performance measures . . . for 
assessing their own individual antigang programs . . . most of these are in the early stages 
of implementation.”10 The recommendations from the 2010 GAO report acknowledge the 
problem of performance metrics but do not offer a model or method.11 
A Congressional Research Service study agrees with the GAO 2010 assessment in 
its evaluation of how federal law enforcement coordinates with other agencies in the 
southwest border region of the United States.12 This study shows that multi-agency task 
forces do not have metrics in place to evaluate performance making it difficult to know 
when a task force should disband or fund should be cut back. The study proposes measuring 
success by terms of outputs, inputs, and results.13 This is a common theme in the literature 
and is the closest recommendation for how to measure the success of a gang task force. 
The importance of developing a strategy is a common theme throughout the 
literature about the successes and failures of anti-gang efforts. Strategy is the foundation 
of developing an intelligence picture based on what is known and unknown. According to 
Christopher Allen’s master’s thesis, the U.S. government and Department of Defense 
(DoD) “must synchronize strategy, structure, and culture in order to solve information 
sharing problems with efforts to combat transnational organized crime.”14 According to an 
unnamed senior DoD official, the U.S. “‘lacks a robust system for effective, efficient 
                                                 
9 Eileen R. Larence, Combating Gangs: Better Coordination and Performance Measurement Would 
Help Clarify Roles of Federal Agencies and Strengthen Assessment Efforts, GAO-09-708 (Washington, 
DC: Government Accountability Office, 2009), https://www.gao.gov/assets/300/292967.pdf. 
10 Eileen R. Larence, Combating Gangs: Federal Agencies Have Implemented a Central Gang 
Strategy, but Could Strengthen Oversight and Measurement of Efforts, GAO-10-395 (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2010). 
11 Larence, Combating Gangs: Federal Agencies Have Implemented a Central Gang Strategy. 
12 Bjelopera, Jerome P., and Kristin Finklea. Domestic Federal Law Enforcement Coordination: 
Through the Lens of the Southwest Border, CRS Report No. R43583 (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, June 3, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43583.pdf. 
13 Bjelopera and Finklea, Domestic Federal Law Enforcement Coordination. 
14 Christopher W. Allen, “Strange Deja Vu: Tackling Information Sharing Problems for Efforts 
against Transnational Organized Crime” (master’s thesis, Air University, 2015), 85, http://www.dtic.mil/ 
dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1015821.pdf. 
7 
information sharing’ among federal law enforcement, intelligence, and military 
organizations on the transnational organized crime threats.”15 Solutions recommended in 
Allen’s study include having “a sound strategy, effective structures to implement the 
strategy, and organizational cultures that embrace the strategy and fully leverage structural 
resources to achieve strategic goals.”16 
Some research indicated that gang task forces are “largely a reaction to ‘political, 
public, and media pressure’ rather than a response to an objective problem.”17 A 2007 
Justice Policy Institute report examines many problems with gang task forces, including 
the lack of relationship between the crime problem and law enforcement response.18 The 
report contends the relationship may indicate that law enforcement does not understand 
how to address the actual crime problem posed by gangs.19 It noted that law enforcement 
was often impervious to collaboration or implementation of a strategy.20 This research 
provided examples “that [gang] intervention had no effect or a negative effect on crime 
and violence.”21 Although this report had a strong bias against gang task forces, the 
emphasis on lack of collaboration and strategy within gang task forces was a consistent 
theme throughout all the literature. 
The literature in this section discussed some of the successes and challenges of anti-
gang task forces and unequivocally advocates using them to combat the violent crime gang 
problem. Successes of anti-gang task forces include combining resources and intelligence 
sharing; however, what is missing from the literature is how anti-gang task forces use 
intelligence for strategy and decision making. Along those lines, the literature highlights 
that anti-gang task forces lack implementation of performance metrics. Aside from 
15 Allen, “Strange Déjà Vu,” 4. 
16 Allen, 6. 
17 Judith Greene and Kevin Pranis, Gang Wars: The Failure of Enforcement Tactics and the Need for 
Effective Public Safety Strategies (Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute, 2007), 70, 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/07-07_rep_gangwars_gc-ps-ac-jj.pdf. 
18 Greene and Pranis, Gang Wars. 
19 Greene and Pranis, 5. 
20 Greene and Pranis, 5. 
21 Greene and Pranis, 5. 
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counting arrests and convictions, literature on measuring the success and impact of anti-
gang task forces is virtually nonexistent at the local, state, and federal levels. 
2. Performance Measurement 
The literature on the development of performance measurement and its significance 
to organizational effectiveness is drawn to some extent from U.S. government reports, but 
it is predominantly from academic and business community experts. Many gang task forces 
use crime statistics to assess performance, even though a large body of research in this area 
demonstrates that arrests and crime statistics do not accurately measure effective 
performance. The logic model is the predominant framework in the literature on measuring 
organizational performance, and variations of this model could be of use for TAGs. 
Originally developed by the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, the logic model uses five steps 
(inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and impact) to model how an organization achieves 
its work.22 The purpose of the logic model is to provide participants a visual aid in 
connecting related events to desired results and outcomes.23 
Many of the frameworks in the literature―including H. P. Hatry’s, which focuses 
primarily on tracking results and outcomes―draw from Kellogg’s logic model.24 Carter 
McNamara is another scholar who endorses logic models for measuring performance, 
suggesting that a logic model can be adapted to fit any organization’s goals.25 McNamara 
argues that the model can be useful in driving the planning and analysis of an organization 
at its creation.26 Both Hatry’s and McNamara’s work illustrate how organizations can alter 
the logic model based on individual needs and goals. 
                                                 
22 W. K. Kellogg Foundation, Using Logic Models to Bring Together Evaluation and Action: 
Logic Model Development Guide (Battle Creek, Michigan: W. K. Kellogg Foundation, 1998), 1, 
https://www.bttop.org/sites/default/files/public/W.K.%20Kellogg%20LogicModel.pdf. 
23 W. K. Kellogg Foundation, 1. 
24 H. P. Hatry, Performance Measurement: Getting Results (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 
2006), 2. 
25 Carter McNamara, “Guidelines and Framework for Designing Basic Logic Model,” last modified 
January 15, 2018, https://managementhelp.org/evaluation/logic-model-guide.htm. 
26 McNamara, “Guidelines and Framework for Designing Basic Logic Model.” 
9 
Sharon Caudle, a homeland security professional and lecturer, discusses logic 
models and other approaches for evaluating performance in an article that looks at multiple 
models, including the logic model.27 Caudle asserts that “all of these models could be 
molded into an analytical framework used in individual organizations depending on needs 
of the organization.”28 She explores several methods in her research that could be used for 
the TAGs. Caudle’s article and analysis of logic models differs from the Kellogg model 
and Hatry’s and McNamara’s work in that she proposes eight models applicable to the 
homeland security enterprise focusing on the mission. 
Mission is a unique component to the U.S. government in terms of performance 
metrics, and Caudle’s performance models may appeal to TAG, whose mission is unclear 
in some locations. Caudle contends that “the starting point for results management is its 
mission regardless of whether the term ‘homeland security’ or ‘national preparedness is 
used.’”29 She argues, 
The challenges for homeland security is to craft a results management 
approach that (a) incorporates prevention, vulnerability reduction, and 
response and recovery; (b) sets goals for and assesses programs in 
combating domestic terrorism and other hazards at the same time; (c) 
facilitates integrating the capabilities of many organizations; (d) makes 
investment choices to close any gap between current and needed 
capabilities; (e) continually evaluates results and strategies; and (f) balances 
all of these goals in terms of sustainability.30 
Her focus on mission within the homeland security field is a common theme throughout 
the literature from the U.S. government perspective. 
All the literature reviewed on performance metrics references the Kellogg logic 
model or some variation of the framework. The literature was consistent in concluding that 
using crime statistics is not a good method for measuring law enforcement performance. 
For example, a 2003 Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies 
27 Sharon Caudle, “Homeland Security: Approaches to Results Management,” Public Performance 
and Management Review 28, no. 3 (March 2005): 352–75. 
28 Caudle, 352. 
29 Caudle, 352. 
30 Caudle, 353. 
10 
(CALEA) article on measuring law enforcement performance notes the problems in using 
crime statistics and arrest numbers to measure police success.31 One reason is that criminal 
activity is influenced by more than enforcement of the law.32 The article contends that 
“crime is the product of a complex array of social, economic, and political forces,” and 
arrests do not effectively convey successful performance.33 A U.S. Department of Justice 
guide for law enforcement executives and managers written by David. J. Roberts concurred 
that crime statistics are not indicative of whether law enforcement is “improving the quality 
of life for city residents, efficient use of resources, or effective for operations.”34 
Transitioning to the literature on performance measurement within the business 
sector, the idea that organizations need to examine how to translate actions into goals is 
explored by Chris McChesney, Sean Covey, and Jim Huling.35 They examine theories 
about how effective execution of a strategy is achieved and  argue that convincing people 
to change within a company is the most difficult part of executing a strategy.36 The focus 
is ensuring that the company’s highest priorities are translated into goals by leadership.37 
McChesney, Covey, and Huling propose that helping employees understand goals and play 
a direct role in developing actions to meet those goals encourages and fosters 
collaboration.38 
Objectives and Key Results by Paul Niven and Ben Lamorte is another performance 
measurement framework recommended in the business sector. The book reviews the types 
                                                 
31 Edward Maguire, “Measuring the Performance of Law Enforcement Agencies - Part 1 of a 2-Part 
Article” CALEA Update Magazine, No. 83, September 2003, http://www.calea.org/calea-update-magazine/
issue-83/measuring-performance-law-enforcement-agencies-part-1of-2-oart-articl. 
32 Maguire, “Measuring the Performance of Law Enforcement Agencies.” 
33 Maguire, “Measuring the Performance of Law Enforcement Agencies.” 
34 David J. Roberts, Law Enforcement Tech Guide for Creating Performance Measures That Work: A 
Guide for Executives and Managers (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services, 2006), 7, http://www.search.org/files/pdf/PMTechGuide.pdf. 
35 Chris McChesney, Sean Covey, and Jim Huling, The Four Disciplines of Execution (New York, 
NY: Free Press, 2012), Kindle. 
36 McChesney, Covey, and Huling, loc. 363 of 5091. 
37 McChesney, Covey, and Huling, loc. 410 of 5091. 
38 McChesney, Covey, and Huling, 410 of 5091. 
11 
of environments in which employees do their best work and make contributions that move 
a company forward.39 Their analysis suggests that company’s need to be “crystal clear 
about the destination” and goal-setting or time is wasted.40 This is accomplished through 
understanding the company’s strategy and how employees can contribute. Once that is 
achieved, the company can apply a system of measurement to the strategy.41 Niven and 
Lamorte believe that when objectives and key results (OKRs) are successful, they support 
what matters most to the company.42 
Multiple U.S. reports as well as academic research recommended using logic 
models as a framework for law enforcement performance, particularly for gang task forces. 
The literature within the business realm focuses on how vital a strategy with clear and 
concise goals and objectives is for the success of a company. More important, goals that 
are clearly translated into actions must be articulated for those responsible for contributing 
to the success of the mission. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The object of this research was to identify a performance measurement system or 
framework that could be used to achieve goals and objectives and, ultimately, the TAG 
mission. The first step was to understand how TAGs are currently organized and how 
agencies within the TAGs collaborate in support of the mission. The research focused on 
examining existing TAG documents, policies, and processes to determine how TAGs are 
encouraged to work collaboratively within and outside the program. Some of this 
information was available because of the writer’s involvement with the North Texas TAG 
in supervising the intelligence component for the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) 
operational squad, one of five squads. Other research came from journals, U.S. government 
reports, and open sources such as the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) crime statistical 
39 Paul Niven and Ben Lamorte, Objectives and Key Results: Driving Focus, Alignment, and 
Engagement with OKRs (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2016), Kindle. 
40 Niven and Lamorte, loc. 245 of 4631. 
41 Niven and Lamorte, loc. 291 of 4631. 
42 Niven and Lamorte, loc. 245 of 4631. 
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data. Although the six TAGs may vary in operation because they are managed by separate 
executive boards, the writer has access to the TAGs and their executive board members, 
who provided information and documents on the background, structure, mission, and 
processes of the TAGs. 
An analysis was conducted of performance management models for improving and 
sustaining strong collaboration and performance measurement, including the logic model 
for performance measurement, which seemed most suited for TAG’s purposes. This model 
in particular has been validated in law enforcement and multi-agency operating 
environments with either overlapping or divergent jurisdictions, leadership structures, 
mission statements, and strategies. In addition to the logic model, the objective and key 
results framework was used to show how teams can better work together to deconstruct the 
mission into objectives, measures, and activities to increase the effectiveness of the TAG. 
Next, the principles and elements of the logic model were applied to the mission 
and purpose of the TAGs to yield a set of implementation recommendations for a new TAG 
performance management model. This new model includes elements that better define the 
mission and include an articulated strategy with goals and objectives directly supporting 
the mission. The mission should incorporate sound intelligence analysis that specifies 
presence, capability, and activities associated with the gangs for each TAG center. The new 
model will better define roles within the TAG center to make intelligence processes and 
sharing information consistent for TAGs across the state of Texas. Finally, each TAG 
center should develop a system of performance measurement by using a logic model that 
includes a visual aid in showing the inputs, outputs, activities, and outcomes, providing 
accountability to CJD and the community at large about the impact TAGs have on the gang 
threat. 
Providing a system of accountability for performance measurement is a limitation 
of this thesis because it goes beyond the scope of the thesis. The logic model was selected 
as a framework for performance measurement based on multiple recommendations from 
the literature review for gang task forces. The model contains basic principles that seem 
simple to apply to a multi-agency setting, assuming the investigators and analysts can 
identify those principles. 
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II. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain why a system of performance measurement 
is essential to improving the effectiveness of TAG operations by ensuring that the 
investigations and actions conducted support the TAGs’ mission. The chapter examines 
how to develop a strategy to evaluate performance using a logic model and explores how 
to connect employees with the OKRs framework to ensure they are contributing to the 
organization’s highest priorities. The chapter also examines why the current system of 
evaluation using crime statistics may not accurately measure the work being conducted at 
the TAGs. 
Measuring law enforcement performance in a multi-agency setting such as TAG is 
challenging yet vital for accountability. An established system of performance 
measurement provides both citizens and officials an overview of results achieved based on 
funds and support provided.43 Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies have 
systems in place to track crime data. However, most do not keep track of their specific 
impact on work toward gang program goals to outcomes; a framework is needed to ensure 
the teams are working together to move the TAGs forward.44 Before presenting the 
proposed model, benefits and limitations are covered under the following categories: 
• Measuring TAG performance 
• Strategy, goals, and objectives development 
• The logic model 
• The problem of using crime rates to measure law enforcement 
performance 
                                                 




• Common problems identified in measuring performance within anti-gang 
task forces 
A. MEASURING TAG PERFORMANCE 
Currently, each TAG must justify its existence once a year via a fiscal agent, which 
provides an opportunity to measure impact and success.45 Aside from requiring reports 
from TAGs that describe arrests, convictions, and cash seizures, there is no method of 
examining how the TAGs address their mission or goals and objectives.46 CJD primarily 
serves as a financial platform once a TAG is established. The CJD Office of the Governor 
provides $5.1 and up to $10 million each year in support of the current six TAGs.47 The 
funds “are authorized under Section 772.007 of the Texas Government Code,” which 
designates CJD as the administering agency.48 The source of funding is “a biennial 
appropriation by the Texas legislature from funds collected through court costs and fees.”49 
As of this writing, funds are not withdrawn on the basis of how the TAG performs and 
mitigates the threat posed by gangs. 
A system of performance measurement is a requirement in the grant application to 
the CJD and is also encouraged within TAG internal documents. In 2017, CJD added new 
requirements to the grant application addressing performance measurement. The applicant 
must discuss how the TAG defines activities and measures those activities. TAGs must 
decide how output performance will be measured.50 After the initial screening, the 
application moves to a merit review phase, which is reviewed by the CJD executive 
                                                 
45 Andrew Friedrichs, Associate Director–Criminal Justice Division, provided writer with an internal 
document, Texas Anti-Gang (TAG) Program dated May 15, 2017. 
46 Andrew Friedrichs, Texas Anti-Gang (TAG) Program dated May 15, 2017. 
47 Andrew Friedrichs, Texas Anti-Gang (TAG) Program dated May 15, 2017. 
48 Andrew Friedrichs, Associate Director–Criminal Justice Division, Office of Governor Greg Abbott, 
telephone interview January 11, 2018. 
49 Andrew Friedrichs, Associate Director–Criminal Justice Division, provided writer with an internal 
document, Texas Anti-Gang (TAG) Program dated May 15, 2017. 
50 Office of the Governor, Criminal Justice Division, Funding Announcement: Texas Anti-Gang 
(TAG) Program, May 15, 2017. 
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director.51 A variety of activities are assessed and assigned points, which must equal 100.52 
Some of the activities directly relate to performance measurement include the following: 
35 points for having a strategy that delivers proposed outcomes and an 
approach based on logical practices 
15 points for performance measurement that the organization is capable of 
accurately assessing needs, is able to manage and execute strategies and 
plans, has the skills and capacity to measure, analyze, and respond to 
performance data, has a plan or method to monitor results and performance, 
and uses this information to inform changes to the TAG approach53 
Even though the grant application specifically addresses performance management, 
CJD does not provide a model or framework that details how the TAG center executive 
boards are to develop, create, and enact this. CJD recommends that all TAG centers model 
their operations after the Houston TAG; therefore, all TAGs currently measure success by 
the number of arrests and indictments based on that example. This is likely because 
Houston was the first TAG. These types of statistics are sent to CJD on a quarterly basis. 
No data are collected, however, to track or measure increases or decreases in the number 
of violent gangs or how gang crime affects the state of Texas. As a result, the impact of the 
TAG’s collaborative efforts against gangs has yet to be determined. 
Moving away from reporting statistics may seem unfamiliar to law enforcement 
agencies within a TAG. Thinking about performance measurements extending beyond 
statistics will force TAGs to critically evaluate what they want from their squads, their 
strategy, and their outcomes. McChesney, Covey, and Huling introduce the idea of 
examining lagging versus leading indicators as part of executing a strategy.54 One 
discipline they list concentrates on understanding that employees or the team can focus on 
only one or two goals and those goals must be among the highest priorities for the 
                                                 
51 Office of the Governor, Criminal Justice Division, Funding Announcement: Texas Anti-Gang 
(TAG) Program, May 15, 2017. 
52 Office of the Governor, Texas Anti-Gang (TAG) Program, May 15, 2017. 
53 Office of the Governor, Texas Anti-Gang (TAG) Program, May 15, 2017. 
54 McChesney, Covey, and Huling, The Four Disciplines, loc 501 of 5091. 
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organization.55 Another involves understanding that not all performance measures are 
created equal and that some have more impact than others.56 They propose that progress 
toward measures should be based on a lag-and-lead system.57 Lead measures are the tasks 
or actions taken toward achieving goals, and lag measures are created to evaluate behaviors 
that will drive success on the lead measures.58 Lead measures are predictive of achieving 
the goal and can be influenced by the team members.59 For example, a TAG may have an 
objective to reduce drug trafficking within community gangs. Lag measures for this 
objective might include the number of drug trafficking arrests or the number of drug 
possession arrests. The leading indicators, or measures a community will see only if these 
two lagging measures decrease, potentially include, for example, a decrease in drug 
overdose deaths and a decrease in infectious disease caused by drug use. 
Aside from arrests, convictions, and seizures, the TAG centers do not have a 
mechanism to set goals or measure how the operational squads support the mission. Likely, 
there are examples of squads deterring and combating gangs and related crimes, but no 
method exists to prove that is happening. Collaboration among federal, state, and local law 
enforcement is certain to be enhanced by the proximity of the groups within one location, 
but no measures exist for comparison with previous arrangements. 
B. STRATEGY, GOALS, AND OBJECTIVES DEVELOPMENT 
Before building a system for performance measurement, developing a strategy with 
clear and concise goals and objectives is the first step. Establishing goals and translating 
them into actions is a task common to business, education, and government projects. From 
goals, a group usually moves to an examination of resources, a plan for activities, and a 
projection of outcomes. 
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Paul Niven and Ben Lamorte promote this idea of translating goals into actions by 
expending the most effort at the outset of a performance management system to “make 
measurable contributions that drive the company forward.”60 Niven and Lamorte develop 
the idea of OKRs to connect goals with the strategy of an organization and focus on what 
is most important.61 Organizations must be clear about what they want from their 
employees, or time will be wasted. Niven and Lamorte suggest that OKRs be updated 
quarterly in the following ways: 
• Examine results carefully and modify the organizations’ strategy based on 
the results. 
• Ensure that employees are working together from top to bottom and can 
see OKRs throughout the organization. 
• Focus employees’ efforts instead of handing them a list of tasks, identify 
the most critical objectives, and gauge accountability through quantitative 
key results. 
• Make contributions that can be calculated and quantified. Avoid 
subjectivity as much as possible. 
• Drive the organization forward as success is achieving goals.62 
Niven and Lamorte define an objective as a “concise statement outlining broad 
qualitative goals designed to propel organizations forward.”63 They define a key result as 
a “quantitative statement that measures the achievement of a given objective.”64 The 
objective is what the organization wants to accomplish, and the key result is measuring that 
accomplishment.65 The performance measurement system will be improved if the OKRs 
are updated several times a year to ensure flexibility, especially in law enforcement to 
respond to gang crimes, which are constantly changing. Niven and Lamorte contend that 
                                                 
60 Niven and Lamorte, Objectives and Key Results, loc. 486 of 4361. 
61 Niven and Lamorte, loc. 350 of 4361. 
62 Niven and Lamorte, loc. 486 of 4361. 
63 Niven and Lamorte, loc. 534 of 4361. 
64 Niven and Lamorte, loc. 534 of 4361. 
65 Niven and Lamorte, loc. 534 of 4361. 
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to achieve a successful performance management, the organization has to develop 
processes and tasks that align with the OKRs in addition to the following requirements: 
• Having supportive and enthusiastic executives 
• Determining where to organize OKRs 
• Connecting OKRs throughout the organization 
• Reporting the results 
• Documenting what has been learned 
• Instilling the methodology in the culture of the organization66 
Employees who understand the mission and the strategy in support of that mission 
will be able to identify goals and objectives. Niven and Lamorte indicate that the number-
one challenge leaders fail to forecast is failure to execute a strategy.67 “Execution equals 
alignment; in fact, today most work is cross-functional in nature and forced cascading often 
obscures this fact by creating silos that act solely in their own best interests.”68 
Actions in support of goals and objectives can then be measured and quantified, 
which leads to performance measurement. This process, using a logic model, described in 
the next section, can assist with alignment of resources, roles, and contributions in support 
of the mission. 
C. THE LOGIC MODEL 
A logic model is the next step and visually depicts the goals and their associated 
action items for visualization. It can provide a framework that helps guide decisions and 
assessment of performance. Because the TAG centers are a relatively new concept, the 
development of policies is still evolving. The logic model is particularly attractive for 
multi-agency centers because it offers a solid framework while at the same time being 
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progressively flexible. A brief background and context regarding the logic model’s 
application will help explain its origins. 
Caudle’s research into performance measurement within the homeland security 
arena shows that the logic model generally starts with the outcomes and impact and then 
goes backward to identify what is needed to accomplish the task.69 “The outcome 
definition should define specific goals and objectives and targets for program 
intervention.”70 
Caudle asserts that the challenge for homeland security is to “craft a results-
management” approach using a logic model.71 She emphasizes that goals must be 
established that incorporate prevention and reduction of crime as well as operational 
strategies.72 She also stresses the need to integrate the skills of many organizations to 
address current issues.73 Caudle noted that once a logic model is developed, it needs to 
evolve and change to ensure that tactics are assessed and improved.74 
Hatry asserts that the logic model details performance measures as a means to 
determine “results (outcomes) and efficiency so the services or programs” can be compared 
to their intended purpose.75 Hatry states, “A well-designed measurement system enables 
agency managers to assess the fairness of a program and adjust it appropriately. A good 
performance measurement system will help officials demonstrate to the public and to 
policymakers that services are delivered fairly—and this will build trust.”76 
                                                 
69 Sharon Caudle, “Homeland Security: Approaches to Results Management,” Public Performance 
and Management Review 28, no. 3 (March 2005): 352–75. 
70 Caudle, 360. 
71 Caudle, 356. 
72 Caudle, 359. 
73 Caudle, 359. 
74 Caudle, 359. 
75 Hatry, Performance Measurement, 2. 
76 Hatry, 4. 
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Hatry’s logic model is built on the foundations of W. K. Kellogg Foundation’s logic 
model that uses five steps to create a system to measure performance for an organization.77 
Kellogg’s logic model represents “a picture of how your organization does its work—the 
theory and assumptions underlying the program.”78 The logic model connects outcomes 
with the organization’s activities and processes.79 The five components of this logic model 
are as follows: 
• Forces (inputs)—the personnel, equipment, and organizational resources 
dedicated to the program 
• Activities—the processes, techniques, and actions of the program 
• Outputs—the direct results of the program activities (i.e., the scope of 
services and products delivered 
• Outcomes—the specific changes in program participant’s knowledge, 
skills, and level of functioning 
• Impact—the changes or results that are realized from program outputs 
and outcomes (e.g., improved conditions)80 
Two additional advocates for using logic models to design gang task force 
activities, outputs, outcomes, and impacts are the National Institute of Justice and the 
Bureau of Justice.81 The National Institute of Justice and the Bureau of Justice produced a 
guide titled, “Evaluation of the Multijurisdictional Task Forces (MJTF), Phase II: MJTF 
Performance Monitoring Guide” and supported logic models as a framework for measuring 
task force performance.82 
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Caudle believes the one significant limitation for homeland security’s use of logic 
models is that it targets programs “normally within an organization’s control, as the unit of 
analysis.”83 Logic models could become multifaceted in the field of homeland security 
because there are intricate relationships between organizations and programs.84 Hatry also 
discusses limitations in using the logic model. He believes the analysis and assessment of 
outcomes may be delayed or avoided by law enforcement agencies because of the fear of 
blame for not achieving goals.85 Hatry contends that the agency and “its personnel . . . 
have a responsibility to track the relevant outcomes and use that information to help 
improve results.”86 He insists that a system be in place for assessment when the model 
becomes operational. 
In law enforcement, where the environment is mainly reactive as opposed to 
proactive, negative attitudes could affect implementation of a logic model. Hatry 
characterizes attitudes limiting the implementation of a system of performance measures 
with the following examples:87 
• “You cannot measure what I do.” 
• “Measures are not fair because I do not have total control over the 
outcome or the impact.” 
• “It will invite unfair comparisons.” 
• “Performance data will be used against our program.” 
• “It’s just a passing fad.” 
• “We don’t have the data; we can’t get the data.” 
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• “We don’t have the staff or resources to collect the data.” 
• “We cannot measure prevention; it’s not our responsibility.” 
Hatry acknowledges that the problematic nature of measuring crime and decreasing 
drug use is not that different from the work being done at the TAGs,88 but he believes 
substitutes are acceptable.89 One of the problems with using statistics to track violent gangs 
is that gang statistics are virtually nonexistent. The FBI’s UCR statistics track crime data 
from U.S. law enforcement agencies. However, it lacks categories to track violent crimes 
committed by gangs. The National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) also 
collects information about crimes across the United States, and although one can search for 
gangs under crime type, the data are not helpful because many victims do not know if the 
offender(s) were involved in a gang. In addition, the NIBRS data on gangs reflects only 
data from 1992 to 2008. The next section explores whether crime statistics are a sufficient 
measure of performance in law enforcement. 
D. HOW TAGs MEASURE PERFORMANCE AND INHERENT PROBLEMS 
WITH USING CRIME STATISTICS 
1. Current TAG Performance Measurement 
As previously established, the six operational TAGs do not have a mechanism in 
place to evaluate the effectiveness of TAG operations or intelligence against the threat 
posed by violent gangs. If there are no goals and objectives that focus operations, it is very 
difficult to quantify TAG performance. The Houston TAG developed a standard operating 
procedure for providing statistics and metrics, and other TAG centers were directed to 
model operations based on Houston’s policies.90 According to the Houston TAG Center 
Standard Operating Procedure No. 2, dated January 10, 2013, each TAG must provide a 
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quarterly report on “statistics and metrics of enforcement activity taken by agencies 
working at the TAG Center.”91 These statistics include the following: 
• Number of arrests (felony and misdemeanor) 
• Federal arrests 
• Country of birth of arrestees 
• State convictions (felony and misdemeanor) 
• Federal convictions 
• Currency/monetary instruments seized (including bank accounts) 
• Firearms seizures 
• Drugs seized (type and quantity)92 
The quarterly report is submitted to the Texas DPS Criminal Investigative Division 
Gang section. This agency is then responsible for assembling TAG center quarterly 
submissions into a report that is disseminated to the TAG center agencies, DPS 
management, and other entities as directed by the TAG Center executive boards.93 In 
addition, the TAG administrator is responsible for sending TAG center quarterly reports to 
the appropriate district attorney office designee to ensure that relevant information is 
transmitted to CJD for status reporting and additional grant requests.94 As long as TAG 
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centers are arresting, indicting, and making cash seizures, their work is deemed successful 
and worthwhile. 
2. Problems with Using Crime Statistics to Evaluate Performance in 
Law Enforcement 
Setting metrics is complex in a multi-agency environment because definitions, 
thresholds, variables, and units of measurement vary from agency to agency, making it 
difficult to establish a mutual set of standards. It is likely that no one takes responsibility 
to establish a system because of these difficulties. 
Statistics do not measure the correlation between arrest rates and the reduction of 
gang crime. It is unclear whether more or fewer arrests reflect effectiveness. George 
Kelling, a prominent criminologist, contends that “‘measuring police performance solely 
by crime statistics simply ignores consequential values . . . [such as] justice, integrity, fear 
reduction, citizen satisfaction, protection and help for those who cannot protect or help 
themselves, and many others.’”95 
Using crime rates alone as a measure of performance is problematic, according to 
a 2003 CALEA magazine article written by Edward R. Maguire. Maguire asserts that law 
enforcement is not the only influence on crime rates.96 He states, “Arrest represents one of 
the most visible measures of police output. Furthermore, it is one of the few output 
measures collected from most police agencies in the country.”97 He notes that in additions 
to law enforcement actions (i.e., arrests), crime also has social and economic impacts.98 
Maguire’s research shows that although police actions can have an impact on some types 
of crime, other types are very difficult to reduce.99 In addition, a significant amount of 
crime is not even reported to law enforcement but still has an impact on a neighborhood or 
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section of the city.100 Maguire argues that “before using crime rates as measures of police 
performance, it may be necessary to ‘adjust’ them statistically to account for other 
factors.”101 Maguire states that crime rates from police data are essentially 
“‘organizational outcomes.’. . . They are as much a product of the police department that 
produced them as they are of the community or situation in which the alleged offenses took 
place.”102 
The lack of performance evaluation in the law enforcement programs is a problem 
according to U.S. government reviews and academics who study anti-gang task forces. To 
counter this problem, the authors of a National Criminal Justice Reference Service report 
identify three reasons programs should be monitored: (a) to promote accountability, (b) to 
support decisions about sustaining the task force, and (c) to inform program improvement. 
The authors of the report state, “Accountability in government is an unavoidable part of 
today’s world. Government agencies must provide evidence that public resources are being 
deployed as promised and produce benefits commensurate with their cost.”103 The 
accountability discussion covers the accountability of funding and accountability to the 
public. 
The second reason programs should be monitored is to provide information to 
stakeholders about support decisions related to sustaining the task force. Programs with 
established performance measures being met are more likely to be sustained than are those 
programs without a measurement program in place or measures that are not being met. In 
addition, programs that perform poorly could be granted additional resources by 
stakeholders to help meet performance objectives. The final reason identified by the 
reports’ authors for monitoring program performance is simply to inform program 
improvement. The evidence found in this research supports the need for a measurement 
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program within the TAG; however, there are challenges with measuring performance 
within any task force. 
E. COMMON PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED IN MEASURING PERFORMANCE 
WITHIN ANTI-GANG TASK FORCES 
Even though researchers pinpoint the difficulties incurred when using performance 
measures in anti-gang efforts, they continue to recommend the implementation of such 
evaluation tools. A 2010 GAO report supports the inclusion of performance measures for 
anti-gang efforts and brings into focus the absolute need for clarity and agreement in 
terminology among law enforcement agencies.104 For example, some agencies track “the 
number of investigations that disrupted or shut down criminal gangs, while another agency 
tracks its gang-related convictions.”105 Even the definition of a “gang” can be misleading 
for agencies.106 The lack of a clear definition affects the data collected, which then affects 
the assessment of law enforcement efforts against violent gangs across federal agencies.107 
The report says the Department of Justice “lacks performance measures that would help 
agencies to assess progress made over time on anti-gang efforts and provide decision 
makers with key data to facilitate resource allocation.”108 
Judith Greene and Kevin Pranis’s 2007 report takes a negative view of law 
enforcement’s anti-gang task force efforts and suggests that law enforcement and/or 
policymakers form gang units too quickly in response to gang violence.109 They say law 
enforcement officials and policy-makers should spend more time finding strategies that 
incorporate “a solid understanding of gang issues or a coherent theory of what an 
intervention should accomplish.”110 Greene and Pranis believe the strategy should address 
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objectives, targets, and effects the initiative will have on the targets.111 This describes 
some aspects of using a logic model. They also recommend defining the problem by 
examining whether the issue is gang-related violence or the gang itself.112 Greene and 
Pranis assess that few anti-gang efforts conduct “activities around realistic, measurable 
public safety objectives. . . . Most are unable to articulate a viable theory of how gang 
control activities will have the intended effect on their targets.”113 
Katz and Webb found in their research that once a gang unit was established it, was 
“required to incorporate often competing ideas and beliefs into its organizational structure 
and operational strategy in order to project an image of operational effectiveness even when 
it was otherwise unable to demonstrate success.”114 The researchers found commonalities 
among gang task forces, including intelligence-gathering and suppression activities; 
however, no evidence suggests actual gang prevention.115 Webb and Katz concluded there 
was not a process to evaluate gang task forces or personnel and account for their job 
performance.116 
According to the aforementioned 2006 Law Enforcement Tech Guide, Roberts 
contends law enforcement must have “effective enterprisewide strategic business plans” 
before the establishment of baseline performance measures can be initiated.117 Having a 
strategic plan in place is “fundamental to establishing objectives and a management 
paradigm that will enable effective performance management.”118 Roberts’s assessment is 
that performance measurement fails because of the following factors: 
• Lack of a viable and active strategic planning process within the 
organization 
                                                 
111 Greene and Pranis. 
112 Greene and Pranis. 
113 Greene and Pranis. 
114 Katz and Webb, Police Response to Gangs, 22–23. 
115 Katz and Webb, 96. 
116 Katz and Webb, 451. 
117 Roberts, Law Enforcement Tech Guide, 5. 
118 Roberts, 5. 
28 
• Failure to change the police culture to “embrace” performance 
management and in particular, “accountability” 
• Lack of sufficient funding and technical competency to support 
performance management, especially data collection and analysis on an 
ongoing basis 
• Lack of knowledge, skills, and abilities and the organizational capacity to 
successfully operate effective performance management processes 
• Inability to sustain the performance management process in the face of 
budget cuts and scarce or reduced resources 
• Lack of user input 
• Incomplete requirements and specifications 
• Lack of executive support 
• Unclear objectives 
• Unrealistic time frames 
• Initial establishment of too many measures, rather than selecting core 
measures.119 
Some of the same themes from the literature concerning problems with measuring 
performance within a task force scenario are similar to the TAG centers. Lack of a defined 
strategy, process, and system of accountability—key attributes to performance 
management implementation—will prevent implementing a system of measuring 
performance from the outset. A logic model would be a fairly easy way to evaluate 
performance and a proposed system for the TAGs. 
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III. CONSTRUCTING A PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
SYSTEM FOR THE TAG CENTER 
The purpose of this chapter is to show how a basic performance management and 
goal-setting mechanism could be developed and implemented for the TAGs using a logic 
model to ensure that the overall mission is being accomplished. The mission, purpose, 
goals, and objectives have not been translated into clear and concise actions for the TAG 
centers, nor do the goals correlate to specific outcomes such as changes in crime rates, gang 
activities, or efficiencies of investigations; to address this deficit, the proposed model lays 
the groundwork for each area. It explores how incorporating the OKRs framework can 
ensure that the highest gang priorities for the TAGs are being mitigated. 
This chapter also suggests that a performance management system and goal-setting 
mechanism will improve collaboration among law enforcement agencies working within 
the TAG centers. This system would assist with defining actions and strengthen the TAG 
operational teams by involving them in the goal-setting process, which should also 
contribute to ownership of achievement and successful performance. Documentation of the 
plan, goals, and activities along with metrics is also built into the development and should 
be updated quarterly to demonstrate progress toward goals. 
The transition and implementation into the organizations can be difficult; the 
chapter ends with suggestions regarding implementation for a performance management 
system. There are hurdles to address and overcome. However, the end goal for the TAG 
centers is to enhance performance among law enforcement agencies through the 
identification of a strategy that has clear and articulable goals and the development of 
flexible actions. 
A. PRECEDING ACTIVITIES BEFORE GOAL DEVELOPMENT 
A series of actions must be undertaken before a TAG center can create a logic 
model for performance measurement. Successful implementation and achievement 
depends on (a) leadership engagement, (b) a threat assessment that provides an accurate 
portrayal of the gang problem, (c) prioritization of gang threats in the TAGs area of 
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responsibility, and (d) establishing priorities to develop a strategy, goals, objectives, and 
key results using a logic model as the basis for performance measurement. 
1. Leadership Engagement 
Leadership engagement is the single most important factor in creating, 
implementing, and driving any performance management system within the TAGs. 
Building support from leadership should precede any other activity. McChesney, Covey, 
and Huling discuss strategies for making changes within large organizations, maintaining 
that leadership is solely responsible.120 They believe effective organizational change 
comes from the strategy and execution, something a leader can influence and enforce.121 
With this in mind, because the TAG concept was initiated in the CJD inside the 
Texas Governor’s office and is the decision-making authority in that it controls the funding 
and approval of grant applications, it appears CJD would be the most logical authority to 
solicit support for the system. CJD is also the recipient of the biannual reports from the six 
TAGS and assesses their performance. Alternatively, CJD could delegate or co-manage 
this authority with Texas DPS, a primary stakeholder as the sole state law enforcement 
agency in Texas and part of all six TAG centers. 
Developing a performance management system for the TAGs will not happen 
without support from CJD/TAG leadership. Explanations in the form of a presentation, 
other type of meeting, or policy memo should be scheduled to explain the purpose, 
intentions, and reasoning behind changing the process and implementing performance 
management. Without full leadership support; the system will not be enforced or supported 
by the employees. 
2. Developing TAG Priorities via an Intelligence-based Threat 
Assessment 
TAG center priorities can be selected from a baseline gang threat assessment that 
defines and categorizes the most dangerous gang-related crimes in the area of 
                                                 
120 McChesney, Covey, and Huling. 
121 McChesney, Covey, and Huling. 
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responsibility. Each TAG center should produce a threat assessment that characterizes the 
gang threat and use that assessment to develop a strategy based on the most important 
countergang priorities faced in the area. 
Other priorities could come from a variety of sources, such as from a policy 
mandate, from community-based outreach, or even from an outside law enforcement 
agency. Factors such as demographics, population, and the nature and scope of the gang 
issue vary for each TAG center location. For one TAG center, there may be a prevailing 
gang with a well-known hierarchy and leadership structure, so perhaps the priority for that 
TAG would be on that gang. Another TAG center may contain several smaller street gangs 
committing low-level crimes. A threat assessment fleshes out the threat potential and 
details a gang’s presence, capabilities, and intent within the area of responsibility. 
It is also important that the threat assessments are routinely updated; gang threats 
fluctuate, and threats can change rapidly. This type of environment means that priorities 
should be flexible and TAGs performance measures adaptive. 
The threat assessment will be leveraged by CJD and TAG leadership to make 
decisions regarding the selection of the most significant gang priorities to be addressed. 
Selection of the gang priorities should be used to build goals, objectives, and actions in 
conjunction with the logic model. The next step, using the logic model and the OKR 
framework, is developing a strategy and goals and actions based on priorities. 
B. CREATING A LOGIC MODEL AND OKRS 
According to the 2009 National Institute of Justice and the Bureau of Justice guide, 
logic models “link a program’s goals with its strategies and tactics . . . and are effective 
tools for studying any type of program.”122 As mentioned, using a gang threat assessment 
will assist TAG leadership in prioritizing the gang-related issues the TAG center will 
address. Working on the priorities becomes a large part of the strategy, which can be 
displayed using the logic model structure. Conceivably, a logic model could be developed 
for each priority. 
                                                 
122 Rhodes et al., “Evaluation of the Multijurisdictional Task Forces,” 2009, 6. 
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The logic model is organized by category, including inputs, activities, outputs, 
outcomes, and impact. Another category—goals—can be added to the model as shown in 
Figure 2. In each category, the goals and associated actions are defined to show how the 
threat will be mitigated. The actions detail the number of projected activities as a qualitative 
metric to be measured on a quarterly basis. 
 
Figure 2.  Basic Logic Model Showing Sectors 
1. Goals 
Once the gang priority is assigned to the TAG operation team, using the OKR 
framework, the TAG operational team works together to develop the goals. For example, 
if the priority assigned is to minimize drug trafficking activity from a local gang, the goals 
should address ways to minimize that activity. The teams deliberate and develop the goals 
together. The adoption and motivation to achieve success is increased when the entire team 
is involved in goal development. 
Niven and Lamorte contend that people, from the leadership to the employees, 
should work together so that the goals and actions are visible and understood throughout 
the organization.123 In addition, some goals and actions may take more time than others, 
so it is important to indicate a timeline. 
2. Inputs 
This category encompasses the resources and equipment needed to support goals. 
For the TAGs, the resources are the law enforcement agencies and personnel assigned. 
Two major components that work in tandem are the operational and intelligence 
                                                 
123 Niven and Lamorte, Objectives and Key Results, loc. 371 of 4631. 
Goals Inputs Activities Outputs Outcomes Impacts
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components. The operational component is made up of the police officers, federal agents, 
and other sworn commissioned officers. The intelligence component consists of analysts, 
and research specialist in addition to police officers, federal agents, and other sworn 
commissioned officers. The operational and intelligence components complement each 
other but have distinct and separate functions. 
The operational component is generally charged with leading the gang investigation 
with activities such as surveillances, recruitment and handling of human sources, arrests, 
interviews, prosecution, proffers, and the tactical aspects of an investigation. The 
intelligence component identifies what is known and not known about the gang threat 
within the TAG’s area or responsibility. This is based on multiple sources of information 
such as human and technical sources, law enforcement and open source reporting, and 
information based on liaison with community-based organizations. 
3. Activities 
This category involves the specific activities necessary for the team to meet the 
goal. For the TAG teams, this is generally the investigative and law enforcement activities 
required to achieve mission success. The investigative teams conduct activities such as 
surveillances, recruitment and handling of human sources, interviews, and the tactical 
aspects of an investigation. Law enforcement activities include the arrest and seizure of 
drugs, for example. 
4. Outputs 
The outputs are the results of the TAG operational team investigative and law 
enforcement activities. Rhodes et al. write, “The outputs are representations of activities, 
or measures of the implementation of the program activity.”124 The activities must be 
examined to determine how the outputs relate to the original goal. For example, if the 
activity was to specifically recruit a source with information about a gang leader’s criminal 
activity, did that interview result in obtaining information that could lead to the arrest of 
the gang leader? The output in this case would be the results of the interview. 
                                                 
124 Rhodes et al. “Evaluation of the Multijurisdictional Task Forces,” 7. 
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5. Outcomes 
The outcomes for the TAG operational teams are the changes in the knowledge, 
capabilities, and understanding of the goal. The outcome of an activity is a result of the 
activities implementation; whether a positive or negative result, it’s an outcome. The 
authors of the same report provide this example: “An outcome of mobilizing new 
prosecutorial teams might logically result in increased number of prosecutions of drug 
cases.”125 
6. Impact 
The final category in the logic model, as shown in Figure 3, is impact—that is, 
casual linkage formed between the activities, outputs, and outcomes. The impact is a result 
of successfully accomplishing the mission-related activities to accomplish the goals of the 
task force. An example of an impact of TAG work might be reduced drug availability, drug 
use, and drug-related crime. These reductions are a consequence of the earlier categories 
in the logic model. 
                                                 
125 Rhodes et al., 7. 
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Figure 3.  Illustration of TAG Logic Model 
C. OBJECTIVES AND KEY RESULTS 
The OKR process coincides with logic model development in that it essentially 
connects the mission with the goals. This would ensure that TAGs support the mission and 
concentrate on the most significant problems facing their area of responsibility. Building 
OKRs in conjunction with the logic model will result in a performance management system 
that is flexible and collaborative. Involving the TAG operational teams in this process will 
empower them because they will likely have increased ownership over the model they 
built. 
Not all OKRs and logic models will look the same. Figure 4 is an example of an 
OKR structure based on the overall TAG mission and objectives obtained from CJD.
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Figure 4.  OKR Structure
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At the top of the OKR structure is the defined mission of the TAG, to “support 
strategic partnerships and targeted, regional, multidisciplinary approaches to successfully 
combat gang violence through the coordination of gang prevention, intervention, and 
suppression activities.”126 
In this structure, the objective of “sharing intelligence and information cross-
border,” is broken down into four separate threat areas—prison gangs, street gangs, gang 
activity, and juvenile gang activity. The deconstruction of the threat into its own objectives 
provides a number of benefits. First, because the threat is changing, the key results of the 
OKR structure will also need to change over time to allow for adequate evaluation of the 
effectiveness of TAG operations. Second, deconstructing the objective allows distinct key 
results to be developed that measure effectiveness against each threat; in addition, top-level 
key results would be developed. 
Included in Figure 4 as the last blocks of the OKR structure are the activities 
required to accomplish the key results. One of the biggest challenges in a multi-agency task 
force is a lack of communication about the mission, objectives, and activities to the rank 
and file of the task force. Identifying the activities on the OKR structure increases 
communication within the TAG. It allows the entire task force to know what needs to be 
done to accomplish the defined key results (the measures) to support the objectives and 
mission of the task force. In addition, when the activities are defined and advertised to 
everyone on the force, cross-agency communication is increased. 
The OKR structure in Figure 4 provides only a single example of how a TAG could 
deconstruct its mission into objectives and further into key results and activities to achieve 
those results. This is important because, currently, TAGs do not measure performance or 
key results in accomplishing a defined mission. 
                                                 
126 This information was provided by Andrew Friedrich, Associate Director for Criminal Justice 
Division, Officer of the Governor of Greg Abbott, to writer on January 11, 2018. 
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D. INCORPORATION OF PERFORMANCE METRICS 
Once the logic model and OKRs have been developed, designating metrics to 
evaluate performance is the next step. Measuring performance internally demonstrates to 
CJD how well the TAG operational teams are addressing the mission and how well all 
TAG centers are working toward the mission. It also shows agency heads who are not 
directly located at the TAG centers how well their personnel are doing. Measuring 
performance and reporting success externally validates to the state of Texas that the TAGs 
are countering gangs and protecting communities. 
1. Methods to Track Performance 
Assigning metrics or numbers is a simple way to reflect how many activities, 
outputs, and outcomes were accomplished over a certain period of time. Using Figure 4, 
the TAG team could project a target number of activities in each sector. This quantitative 
element of would show the number achievements toward the goal. 
It should be noted that although crime statistics composed of arrests, seizures (of 
money, drugs, property), indictments, prosecutions, and guilty pleas can be quantified and 
projected as a measure by the TAG operational teams, other metrics should be developed. 
Aside from crime statistics, the number of intelligence reports, surveillances, interviews, 
source recruitments, and liaison meetings (to name a few) can also be projected in numbers. 
Table 1 shows a simple way to account for metrics in each category of the logic model. 
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Table 1.   Performance Metrics within the Logic Model 
 
 
Although this chart may appear modest in terms of projecting numbers of activities, 
outputs, and outcomes, the emphasis is on team collaboration and goal setting, which is the 
larger piece of this framework. The team creates what it believes can be accomplished 
within a certain time frame. It then projects specific measures in terms of numbers to 
ultimately show achievement of the goal. 
2. Documentation of Performance Measurement 
At the outset of the performance cycle, both the logic model and the OKRs will 
need to be documented in a report written by each TAG operational team. This report will 
entail what the team plans to accomplish toward the goal, a description of activities to help 
meet that goal, and the number of metrics associated with the activities. The report should 
estimate a time frame in which the team expects to accomplish its plan. Human behavior 
and investigative pursuits fluctuate, so not every TAG operational team can be given the 
same time frame to accomplish goals. This report should provide both quantitative and 
qualitative elements that describe the gang problem, inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, 
and impact. The TAG operational team plan should be discussed among the TAG center 
executive board, TAG operational team supervisor, and the entire TAG operational team 
to ensure that the goals and activities are clear and expectations are understood. 
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3. Measuring Success 
At a minimum, quarterly updates should be provided and documented to CJD and/
or the TAG executive boards. Operational updates or changes in the gang problem may 
arise, so the logic model and OKRs may change. This gives the leadership a chance to 
monitor how well the teams are working, collaborating, and achieving their stated goals. It 
also gives leadership an opportunity to correct course in case of changes in the threat, 
personnel, or related issues. 
On an annual basis, each TAG center should be responsible for documenting its 
performance in regard to the goals and projected activities. This should be a simple task 
because the TAG operational teams would be regularly providing quarterly progress 
reports to update progress. An annual report would provide CJD an overview of how all 
six TAG centers are contributing to the mission. CJD and/or the TAG executive boards 
should be involved in validating the TAG operational team performance plans and 
providing comments and suggestions as appropriate. 
Metrics and measurement are an important part of the process; however, if the TAG 
operational teams are not meeting the exact number estimated months earlier they should 
not be held accountable for that. The measurement of success should instead focus on the 
team’s collaborative work toward its stated goals, activities, and resulting impacts. If there 
are performance issues, a number of options are available, including withholding grant 
funds; however, that decision depends on the issue, and accountability goes beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
The process relies strongly on the leadership to take responsibility for 
accomplishing the mission, prioritizing goals for their teams, and evaluating and measuring 
how their teams are contributing to the mission. If there are problems or concerns, this 




This section discusses the phases in implementing a logic model within a TAG and 
some of the associated challenges. Figure 5 provides a graphic of the phase cycle. 
Figure 5.  Cycle of the TAG Performance Measurement System 
1. Phase I: Threat Assessment and Priority Selection
Phase I consists of developing the logic model for each TAG center operational 
squad. Ideally, this process would start a year before using the logic model as a mechanism 
to measure performance. It may be necessary to add more than a year to this process, 
especially if a gang threat assessment has not been produced or is not available. Before a 
logic model is developed, the TAG center must understand the environment in which the 
gang operates. 
Each TAG center should identify a logic model development team consisting of 
individuals from CJD, TAG executive board, TAG administrative officers, investigators, 
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and analysts. It is important to have a mix of roles on the team, including stakeholders as 
well as gang subject matter experts to have a balanced logic model that reflects viewpoints 
from both the operational and intelligence components. 
The logic model development team should start with the threat picture based on 
timely intelligence of the gang threat posed in each TAG center location. The team will 
need to discuss the gang’s presence, capabilities, and associated criminal activities and then 
rank the issues. It will need to establish which gangs and related activities are causing the 
most disorder in the community. It will also need to identify which gang is responsible for 
which crime and how these factors can be addressed by the TAG in terms of inputs, 
activities, outputs, outcomes, and impact. 
The remaining phases include (II) setting goals and developing a logic model and 
OKRs, (III) documenting the operational plan and assigning metrics to activities, (IV) 
quarterly updating progress toward the operational plan, and (V) evaluation and feedback. 
2. Why Systems Fail within Organizations
When new ideas are implemented, some areas are known to contribute to the failure 
within organizations. McChesney, Covey, and Huling note that weak execution, lack of 
clarity in the objective, lack of commitment to the goal, and accountability are generally 
the major challenges for organizations that transition to alternative systems of operation.127 
Clarity of the objectives wanes in the communication from leadership to the employee, and 
those at the bottom of that pyramid often do not understand the goals they are assigned.128 
The second critical area of failure consists of accountability and not holding employees 
responsible for the work toward the goals and objectives assigned.129 A failure here could 
potentially show that goals were not translated into specific and articulable actions for the 
employees.130 
127 McChesney, Covey, and Huling, The Four Disciplines of Execution, loc. 410 of 5091. 
128 McChesney, Covey, and Huling, loc. 410 of 5091. 
129 McChesney, Covey, and Huling, loc. 410 of 5091. 
130 McChesney, Covey, and Huling, loc. 501 of 5091. 
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3. Recommendations for Moving Employees to Accept Change 
For TAG employees to accept a new performance measurement system as a method 
for evaluating success, current research in organizational change from McChesney, Covey, 
and Huling recommends a few ideas that can help teams achieve goals. They note that 
teams can focus on only one or two ideas at the same time and that leadership has to 
articulate the organization’s highest priorities.131 To keep teams accountable, they 
recommend that leadership define how accountability will be measured at the outset; if is 
not clear to employees on what and how they are being measured, they will not engage 
with a new system.132 Relative to accountability, allowing teams to hold each other 
accountable and discuss how they are working toward their goals further encourages a team 
to work together as a cohesive unit.133 McChesney, Covey, and Huling believe that leaders 
should not tell their teams what to do but instead allow them to initiate their own ideas, 
which will engender more commitment to each other.134 
The introduction of new policies is best received when goals and objectives are 
transparent throughout the organization so that everyone understands how they are being 
measured. According to Niven and Lamorte, “Transparency fuels collaboration, alignment 
and ultimately, the execution of strategy.”135 Involving employees in this process increases 
their contribution, which enhances collaboration. Individuals are shown ways in which the 
process will make their work easier and more useful. Input such as this is also best received 
when enthusiastic and knowledgeable presenters make the introductions; the possibility of 
successful implementation decreases if a packet of information is handed out in a weekly 
meeting by a leader who is not sold on the idea. It should be the responsibility of the CJD 
to develop and message this framework to all TAG centers. 
 
                                                 
131 McChesney, Covey, and Huling, loc. 501 of 5091. 
132 McChesney, Covey, and Huling, loc. 501 of 5091. 
133 McChesney, Covey, and Huling, loc. 544 of 5091. 
134 McChesney, Covey, and Huling, loc. 544 of 5091. 
135 Niven and Lamorte, Objectives and Key Results, loc. 813 of 4631. 
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F. SUMMARY 
This chapter recommends that TAGs consider implementing a performance 
measurement system to ensure that work being conducted by the investigators and analysts 
supports the mission and has an impact on decreasing the gang threat. The benefits of using 
a logic model and OKRs focuses on flexibility that depends on what each TAG center is 
trying to achieve relative to its gang problem. Identification of inputs, activities, outputs, 
outcomes, and impact for each gang threat by both operational and intelligence components 
and assigning metrics to those activities is a significant part of the process. Once assigned 
a gang priority, the TAG operational teams build the logic model, OKRs, and metrics, 
which promote collaboration and ownership for ultimate achievement. 
This system can easily demonstrate success to both internal and external parties, 
because strategies, goals, and progress toward performance are documented on a quarterly 
basis. This provides CJD and related TAG executives’ documentation of performance. 
Achievements and success should also be provided to outside TAG law enforcement 
agencies and the public so that Texas citizens feel safe and protected from the threat posed 
by gangs. CJD should take the initiative and be responsible for evaluating the TAG centers 
on an annual basis to ensure clear communication between expectations and performance. 
Conversely, if there are internal, personnel, or leadership problems, CJD has the 
opportunity to get the TAG center back on track and redefine expectations. 
Finally, for successful implementation of a new performance management system, 
leadership and transparency are critical. Organizations that have not clearly defined their 
goals and communicated them to employees have observed a decrease in the chances of 
successful implementation of a new system. Leadership moves the organization forward 
and ensures that the highest priorities are being addressed and that employees are held 




The initiation of the TAG concept in the state of Texas is an encouraging step 
toward combating violent gang crimes. The collaboration of local, state, and federal 
agencies in one geographic location provides an advantage in dealing with the complex 
issues relative to the threat. With six active TAG centers, the logistics, people, resources, 
and funding are established—a significant beginning. However, advancing the TAG’s 
impact on the communities served requires establishing clearly defined goals and selecting 
actions to support those goals. The next phase should focus on establishing an effective 
performance measurement system that ensures the organization is meeting its 
responsibility to CJD and Texas citizens. This system must promote cross-functionality 
among the TAG teams so that the teams are clear about goals, objectives, and expectations. 
Although TAG policies mention performance management and the TAG centers 
submit quarterly crime statistical reports, research literature consulted for this thesis 
indicates that crime statistics do not accurately measure success toward deterring crime. 
Certainly, the use of crime statistics is one way to quantify law enforcement actions, but it 
does not assess impact or suggest future directions in operational activities. TAG centers 
are in their formative years, so this is an optimal time to develop a new approach to 
evaluation. The incorporation of a logic model and OKRs is particularly attractive. 
The logic model is endorsed by Homeland Security professionals as well as the 
academic and business community. U.S. government reports and journals advocate the use 
of a logic model for goal setting and performance measurement with anti-gang task forces. 
The logic model and OKRs mandate the establishment of unified goals in the TAG centers. 
This forces the TAG operational teams to consider outcomes and impact before actions are 
planned. Once a goal is established, it should be easier for TAG operational teams to define 
their roles and plan strategies and tactics. A unified mission showing clearly defined 
supporting operations will contribute to easier evaluation by policymakers and citizens. 
Evaluation of this performance measurement system is simple and requires routine 
communication between leadership and the TAG operational teams. Discussion of 
46 
achievement toward goals and progress in the activities proposed by the teams is built into 
the process. A quarterly reporting mechanism ensures that leadership has an opportunity to 
make a course correction if a TAG operational team is not working toward its projected 
goals. An annual report should be evaluated to assess performance of all six TAG centers. 
The intention of the thesis was to suggest a good design for performance 
management and a goal-setting mechanism for the TAGs in the state of Texas. A solid 
measurement system will lead to better TAG collaboration among those law enforcement 
agencies that focus on the reduction of gangs and related crimes in the state. Although this 
thesis did not provide a method to incorporate accountability for the performance 
measurement system other than the OKRs, it is an important area to explore. Without 
accountability, what will motivate the operational squads to fulfill their inputs, activities, 
outputs, outcomes, and impact? How else will CJD and the TAG centers show that their 
operational pursuits are working to circumvent the issues relative to gangs and crime? 
Future research on the accountability mechanisms commonly used in law 
enforcement and task forces to measure performance is an area important to further the 
advancement of TAGs. An abundance of research on this topic could be explored outside 
this thesis, and measuring law enforcement performance has been debated in policing 
journals and academic forums. Law enforcement personnel want to be successful and make 
sure they are contributing to the reduction of violent gangs, related crimes, and drug 
trafficking. The next step after the logic model is implemented for the TAG operations is 
to develop a process for holding them accountable for their performance. 
This thesis recommends that the six TAG centers implement a performance 
management system using either a logic model or OKR framework. For this system to be 
successful, altering the existing organizational structure would be necessary as follows; 
• The current TAG leadership structure would have to take on a more active 
role over the six TAG center’s performance. Currently, the TAG executive 
boards instead of a single authority independently manage the six 
individual TAG centers. The most logical authority for a leadership role 
would be CJD or a separate entity within the Texas Governor’s Office. 
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• Knowing that effecting transitional changes within large organizations 
solely depends on leadership advocacy, CJD leadership must lead, 
support, and encourage the development of a performance management 
system. 
• CJD must engage in the process of selecting gang priorities based on a 
threat assessment produced by intelligence analysts, one that categorizes 
the most dangerous gang-related crimes in the six TAG center locations. 
Each TAG center should produce an assessment that characterizes the 
gang threat and then use that to select the most important gang priorities. 
• CJD should allow the TAG centers to develop a logic model and/or OKRs 
that detail the goals, inputs, actions, outputs, outcomes, and impact they 
intend to have to counter the priority gang threat. In addition, each TAG 
center should identify a number of metrics that can be measured 
quantitatively for each activity. This strategy or plan should be 
documented and updated on a quarterly basis to ensure that the leadership 
and TAG centers are clear about what is expected from them. 
• On an annual basis, CJD should review reports and evaluate how the TAG 
centers are working toward accomplishing goals and supporting the 
mission. Performance feedback should be provided to the Texas 
Governor’s Office, TAG centers, and law enforcement agencies 
participating in the TAGs and reported externally to outside TAG law 
enforcement agencies and the public, if appropriate. 
• The annual reports should highlight best practice in gang investigations 
and intelligence reporting and be shared with the six TAG centers and 
outside law enforcement agencies. Conversely, if there are operational 
areas of concern, those should also be shared and debated to develop 
alternate ideas and solutions. 
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